How did a few hundred Spanish soldiers topple two empires? – Si Sheppard
Is it worth your time?
Worth your time if you want to understand the concrete military strategies, political dynamics, and historical conditions that allowed hundreds of conquistadors to topple vast empires.
This conversation examines how small bands of Spanish conquistadors dismantled the Aztec and Inca empires within years. It explores the interplay between military tactics, local political fragmentation, and the historical conditions that shaped early modern conquest.
Spanish military superiority and tactics. Sheppard argues that steel weapons, horses, and psychological shock enabled small numbers of conquistadors to shatter indigenous armies. For example, Pizarro faced tens of thousands of Inca troops with roughly 160 to 190 men at the Battle of Cajamarca, where Spanish forces killed thousands while suffering zero casualties. He notes that cannons and arquebuses did little physical damage, but the illusion of controlling thunder terrified the enemy.
Local alliances against imperial control. Sheppard notes that the rapid conquest succeeded because both the Aztec and Inca empires were built on subjugated populations that readily abandoned them. Cortés commanded only a few hundred Spaniards alongside thousands of Tlaxcalan warriors who sought revenge against Aztec hegemony. Local elites believed they were using the foreign arrivals to their own advantage, failing to recognize the overwhelming demographic tide that would follow.
Cultural constraints on native adaptation. Sheppard argues that indigenous military customs prevented rapid tactical adaptation against European warfare. Aztec and Inca armies prioritized capturing live prisoners for sacrifice rather than killing opponents, while their generals wore ornate decorations that made them easy targets for cavalry. Pre-Columbian operations depended on the agricultural cycle, forcing massive armies to return home for planting and harvesting seasons instead of maintaining prolonged pressure.
Demographic vulnerability and silver economics. Sheppard notes that the ultimate factor behind European victory was the lack of Eurasian domesticated animals in the New World, which left indigenous populations without acquired immunity to contagious diseases like smallpox. He compares the Spanish pursuit of gold and silver to a fixation on assets lacking intrinsic productive capacity, arguing that easy silver acted as a seductive drug that prevented Spain from industrializing. This inflow of bullion served as a redistributive mechanism that caused inflation and reduced real wages, leaving the country relatively poor by the twentieth century.
Cortés’s conquest of the Aztecs
The guest, Si Sheppard, explains that the modern world was born 500 to 600 years ago when Europe, blocked from Eastern spices and silks by the Atlantic, was forced to innovate. Prince Henry the Navigator turned the Atlantic into a highway, and explorers mapped routes around Africa to India while Spain headed west. Christopher Columbus sought Oriental markets by traveling west in 1492, discovering an unexpected continent. In 1511, de Velázquez seized Cuba and sent expeditions to Mesoamerica, later commissioning Hernán Cortés in 1518. Cortés, formerly a chief magistrate with legal training, recruited men for a much larger goal of penetrating the interior and seizing control, ignoring the governor's late attempt to stop him.
Entering the Mainland and Meeting Allies
Sheppard describes how Cortés entered terra incognita and realized that subordinated peoples chafed under a mainland imperial power. He arrived in the lands of the Totonacs, who resented the Aztecs and sought to throw off their authority. Marching inland, Cortés fought the Tlaxcalans to a standstill before they recognized his strength and joined his side as guides and reinforcements. The guest notes that Cortés commanded only a few hundred men against thousands of Tlaxcalans, highlighting the technological differentials between the Old and New Worlds. Firearms were less significant due to slow reloading times, but steel was critical, as Toledan steel swords and steel armor outperformed indigenous weapons of wood, stone, and obsidian. Cortés also used psychological tactics, burying his dead secretly to hide casualties.
The Impact of Horses and the March to Tenochtitlan
The guest emphasizes the horse as the ultimate weapon, noting that North America had no native horses or beasts of burden besides the llama in the Andes, while the Aztecs only had turkeys and Chihuahuas. Conquistadors also brought armored war mastiffs. Cavalry allowed the Spanish to break native formations and retreat swiftly. The Tlaxcalans, surrounded and facing Aztec flower wars and a lack of salt, viewed the alliance as a desperate opportunity to break their strategic trap. They marched with Cortés to Tenochtitlan, where he encountered Moctezuma II through his interpreter Doña Marina, also known as Malinche.
Moctezuma's Dilemma and Spanish Control
Moctezuma, aware of the Spanish arrival, initially bargained and gifted precious items, which only inflamed Cortés's greed for gold. While advisors warned against it, Moctezuma brought the Spaniards into the capital, which Sheppard considers his best option to keep Cortés from inciting subject populations elsewhere. Cortés claimed to speak for Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, though he was entirely unmandated. Stasis ended when news arrived that an Aztec officer had killed Spaniards on the coast. Cortés marched into Moctezuma's palace, placed him under protective custody, and had the responsible officers burned alive.
The Capture of the Emperor and Pánfilo de Narváez
Once Cortés seized Moctezuma, he effectively controlled the empire, governing through a puppet who suffered from Stockholm syndrome. The guest notes that Moctezuma's fatal error was staying in an adjacent palace rather than relocating to rule through subordinates. Meanwhile, the governor of Cuba sent Pánfilo de Narváez with a larger force to arrest Cortés. Cortés left Alvarado in charge of Tenochtitlan, marched to the coast, and won over de Narváez's forces through diplomacy, turning them into reinforcements.
La Noche Triste and the Battle of Otumba
Returning to the capital, Cortés found the mood ruined because Alvarado had massacred the Aztec aristocracy during a festival. The population turned against Moctezuma, who was killed, and besieged the Spanish. Cortés executed a desperate breakout known as La Noche Triste, losing many men. During the retreat to Tlaxcala, the Aztecs pursued them with superior numbers at the Battle of Otumba. Cortés identified the Aztec general, blasted through the ranks with horsemen to eliminate command and control, and saved his army.
The Tlaxcalan Alliance and Final Preparations
The Tlaxcalans sheltered Cortés, treating him as an equal partner rather than a superior, demanding territory and fortresses in return. Other groups like the Totonacs also sought revenge against Aztec hegemony. For the final campaign against Tenochtitlan's new leaders, Cuitláhuac and Cuauhtémoc, indigenous people flocked to Cortés's banner, meaning conquistadors made up only half a percent of the final army. To control the lake, the Spanish harvested sulfur from the Popocatépetl volcano for gunpowder and had human porters carry prefabricated brigantines over the mountains to be assembled on the water.
Pizarro’s conquest of the Inca
The guest, Si Sheppard, states that the conquest of the Incas in Peru under Pizarro ten years later closely followed Cortés's playbook. He points to the Battle of Cajamarca as perhaps the most lopsided military encounter in human history. After Cortés conquered Tenochtitlan in 1821, or rather 1521, conquistadors decapitated the local nobility and inserted themselves at the top, a playbook applied throughout Mesoamerica before they pursued rumors of gold further south.
Francisco Pizarro, a distant cousin of Cortés, secured funding for ships and men, pushing down the west coast of South America into modern Peru. He encountered the vast Inca Empire, which was then fractured by a civil war between the late Sapa Inca's sons, Atahualpa and Huáscar. Atahualpa had just won and was heading to Cuzco to be enthroned when he learned of 168 strangers entering his realm in the Andes. Atahualpa saw opportunity rather than threat, ignoring advice from an envoy who proposed setting fire to where the Spaniards slept to wipe them out. Pizarro impressed Atahualpa by sending a lieutenant to charge a horse straight at the Inca court, stopping inches from the ruler's face. Atahualpa remained stony-faced, executed his own courtiers who had flinched in fear, and proceeded to Cajamarca with a vast army.
Atahualpa entered a narrow courtyard space to meet Pizarro, planning to trap him, but Pizarro launched an ambush with artillery, musketry, and horses. Atahualpa was overwhelmed and taken prisoner, successfully executing the playbook of seizing the pinnacle of the social hierarchy to control the entire structure.
Explaining Conquistador military superiority
The Incan Empire had around 10 million inhabitants, while Pizarro faced off against tens of thousands of troops with roughly 160 to 190 conquistadors. Sheppard notes that the conquistadors killed thousands of the enemy and suffered zero casualties during this first encounter. Both sides felt immense shock; the Spaniards were terrified by the massive campfires surrounding Cajamarca, while the Inca had never encountered gunpowder weapons. Though cannons and arquebuses did relatively little physical damage, the sound and the illusion of controlling thunder proved psychologically devastating.
Steel weapons and horses proved decisive as the Inca experienced something entirely outside their understanding of warfare, leading to a panic where thousands scrambled over walls that eventually collapsed under the weight of the crowd. Pizarro suffered the only Spanish injury, a cut hand while seizing Atahualpa.
Addressing how thousands of troops failed to swarm the cavalry, Sheppard explains that European armies like the Swiss used tight formations and long pikes, whereas Mesoamerican warfare featured loose formations. This looseness allowed cavalry to easily blast through. However, Sheppard emphasizes that both the Aztecs and Inca actively tried to put countermeasures in place.
The Aztecs drew Cortés into their city on Lake Texcoco in 1521, using bridges, causeways, rooftops, and man-sized building holes to minimize horse advantages. Both societies independently used water defensively, with Aztecs breaking lake dikes and the Inca flooding the river at Ollantaytambo to bog down cavalry. The Inca and Aztecs improvised by fixing captured Spanish swords to long wooden poles to create pikes, using captured crossbows and firearms, and employing bolas to tangle horse legs. One Aztec warrior even allowed himself to be speared to hold a conquistador in place for others to pull him down, while Manco Inca learned to ride a horse himself. Despite these efforts, the learning curve was too steep and the timeframe too short to successfully deploy foreign tactics.
Could the natives have beat the Conquistadors?
Si Sheppard emphasizes how fast the conquests happened, noting that Cortés took over the Aztec Empire in two and a half years with a couple hundred men against a population of 6 million, while Pizarro conquered the Inca Empire a decade later in about five years. The native societies had very little time to adapt, while their social structure disintegrated amidst disease and psychological shock. When considering whether the Spanish would win in repeated simulations, Sheppard explains that history is driven by both slow-moving background forces like geography and climate and foreground individuals. If Cortés had been killed early, the conquistadors might have disintegrated, while Atahualpa made a critical mistake by walking into Pizarro's trap instead of keeping negotiations at a distant boundary. Had Atahualpa remained free as the head of an integrated empire, he could have used his numbers to win the campaign in the short term.
After stripping Cuzco of its gold and silver which the Incas called the sweat of the sun and the tears of the moon, Pizarro moved to the coast to establish Lima, leaving his half-brothers in charge of Cuzco. Manco Inca, whom Pizarro had set up as a puppet ruler, was provoked into rebellion, rallied his people, laid siege to Cuzco, and took the fortress of Sacsayhuamán while his general Quizu Yupanqui cut off coastal reinforcements. The Inca won set-piece battles by using their knowledge of the terrain to trap and obliterate Spanish relief columns in narrow mountain passes. However, Manco made the fatal mistake of ordering Quizu to attack Lima across open ground, where the Spanish unleashed their advantages, killed the general, and collapsed the assault.
In Cuzco, a handful of Spaniards held out in fortified buildings under constant assault, noise, and fire threats, saved only by two factors. Open plazas provided good terrain for their remaining horses, and local peoples who had been subordinated by the Inca joined the besieged Spaniards. These groups, including the Cañari, Chachapoya, and Aymara, saw an opportunity to break free from Inca authority, so the Spaniards ended up with more allies than they started with. Sheppard notes that the Aztecs and Incas were themselves imperial forces, with roughly 100,000 Incas ruling 10 million people through a tiny elite. Only a small number of people spoke the imperial languages of Nahuatl or Quechua, meaning these empires were constructed from multiple ethnicities that readily abandoned them.
Contingency aside, Sheppard argues that the ultimate factor came down to background forces like geography and climate, and specifically the lack of Eurasian domesticated animals in the New World. This absence meant indigenous populations lacked acquired immunity to contagious diseases like smallpox, so even if they had won short-term victories, long-term demographic crises would have destroyed their societal cohesion and left them vulnerable to fragmentation. Tenochtitlan, which was a rich and heavily populated metropolis when Cortés arrived, likely would have collapsed from environmental overstress just like the earlier metropolis of Teotihuacan. Eventually, European colonists would have pushed inland to fold these societies into their imperial framework.
Other native forces resisted European powers for a long time, as seen with native tribes fighting late into the 19th century and groups like the Comanche. Sheppard agrees that highly centralized societies fell easily when their single leader was captured, whereas more dispersed groups were harder to conquer. The Maya, for instance, defended their autonomy through separate city-states, forcing the Spanish to reduce their cities one by one in a laborious process lasting nearly to the end of the 17th century. Even as late as 1876 at Custer's Last Stand, the 7th Cavalry was wiped out by warriors who gathered temporarily and then dispersed, requiring total war, barbed wire, and the slaughter of the buffalo to finally bring them to heel.
Neither the Aztecs nor the Incas ever fully incorporated their entire zones, as seen with the Tarascans in Michoacán who went toe-to-toe with the Aztecs. The Tarascans defeated the initial Aztec invasion largely due to technology, as they possessed a South American connection that allowed them to smelt copper and deploy massed archers with copper-tipped arrows. Sheppard notes that if the Aztecs had possessed South American llamas or bronze, which the Incas did have, it would have been an equalizing force, though bronze still could not match iron. The New World societies had the worst of both worlds, as they could smelt silver and gold to attract Spanish greed, but could not smelt iron to hold them off.
The Aztecs and Incas did not learn from each other
Sheppard points out that Europeans accumulated knowledge by learning from each other, while native societies remained insular and closed worlds. Cortés used lessons from Hispaniola, and Pizarro followed the same playbook a decade later, without any indication that the Incas even knew the Aztecs existed. Sheppard suggests the only alternative outcome for pre-Columbian peoples would have required the Norse in Greenland to establish a permanent presence 500 years earlier, thereby introducing European iron, horses, and gradual disease resistance. Without that, they faced a stark disadvantage. Pizarro's main innovation was adhering strictly to the blueprint of establishing secure coastal strongholds. Because Europeans held a monopoly on nautical technology and advanced star-shaped fortifications designed to maximize firepower, local populations had no effective way to uproot them. Indigenous societies lacked siege warfare and heavy equipment, making it nearly impossible to dislodge entrenched Europeans. Furthermore, the physical endurance of the conquistadors enabled them to operate effectively in extreme conditions, such as the high-altitude Andes while wearing heavy armor. These leaders operated as first among equals, constantly managing ambitious rivals. Sheppard notes that both Moctezuma and Atahualpa attempted to cooperate after being captured, likely believing they could manage the situation or buy the foreigners off with gold. Moctezuma, previously a strict autocrat, suffered a psychological collapse under captivity and acted as a puppet until his own people repudiated and killed him for selling them out. Atahualpa, intelligent and adaptive, learned Spanish and played games while offering a room full of treasure for his release. He mistakenly assumed Pizarro operated under royal codes of honor, failing to realize he was dealing with an opportunistic pirate who executed him anyway after receiving the ransom.
Why Spain still lost in the long run
Sheppard compares the Spanish pursuit of gold and silver to a fixation on assets that lack intrinsic productive capacity, likening them to crypto. He notes that this bullion did not generate new net wealth for Europe, but rather served as a redistributive mechanism that caused inflation and reduced real wages in Spain. Instead of building functional capitalism, capital markets, or independent banking systems like those emerging in the Netherlands and England, Spain relied on this silver to fund European wars and purchase goods from the Ming dynasty in China. This inflow of silver ultimately undermined the Ming dynasty when access to it was later cut off, allowing the Manchus to take power. The conquistadors established local estates called encomiendas, while bureaucrats arrived from Spain to administer the colonies. The wealth from Potosí enabled true globalization by connecting trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic trade. However, Sheppard argues that having easy access to silver acted as a seductive drug that left Spain and Portugal behind, failing to industrialize and remaining relatively poor and backward by the twentieth century. He contrasts this with the English in Virginia, whose early struggles forced them to build productive capacity and institutions. He draws a parallel to the American Civil War, where the North invested in trade, advanced capital markets, and industrialization due to a lack of easy cash crops, giving them the long-term advantages needed to defeat the South.
Why didn’t the Aztecs/Incas adapt better to European warfare?
The guest, Si Sheppard, notes that Aztec and Inca strategy and tactics often faltered because their military customs were unsuited to the threat. Aztec warfare aimed at capturing live prisoners for sacrifice rather than killing opponents, allowing Cortés to escape when he was knocked off his horse. Additionally, Aztec and Inca generals wore ornate, plumed decorations that made them easily identifiable, so cavalry could target them directly and rout the entire enemy force. Sheppard observes that the Inca failed to sustain pressure during the siege of Cuzco, allowing the Spaniards to rest at night instead of rotating their overwhelming numbers.
Addressing why such military-focused cultures could not improvise better, Sheppard explains that cultural and religious constraints deeply embedded in their society prevented rapid adaptation. Capturing prisoners brought status and was tied to religious expression, much like feudal European ransoming, making it impossible to abandon these practices in a short timeframe. Furthermore, pre-Columbian military operations depended on the agricultural cycle. Massive armies of diverse, subjugated peoples lacked institutional loyalty to the Inca and had to return home for planting and harvesting seasons to avoid famine, preventing them from maintaining prolonged, overwhelming pressure. Sheppard concludes that the learning curve was simply too short for these societies to successfully reorient their warfare against the conquistadors.
Conquistador motivation
Si Sheppard explains that the conquistadors faced massive native armies despite knowing little about what awaited them, driven by the classic push-pull factors of limited prospects in a poor homeland and the lure of riches abroad. He notes that many came from Extremadura, a dusty and unproductive region where men saw high-risk military ventures as their only escape from being dirt farmers. When news reached Spain that the risk was lower and the rewards higher across the Atlantic, these men crossed the ocean to rely on their fighting skills and each other. Sheppard points out that both Cortés and Pizarro traveled with men of the cloth and professed genuine outrage at the Aztec practice of human sacrifice, which offered them a religious justification and a sense of absolution for their actions. Having encountered weak and ununified island populations in the Caribbean, they expected easy pickings on the mainland, though veterans later admitted the fighting was among the hardest they had ever experienced. Upon arriving at Lake Texcoco, the sight of the glittering metropolis both awed them and inflamed their greed, with Cortés admitting that he and his men suffered from a heart condition that only gold could cure. Sheppard observes that the Spanish documented widespread human sacrifice, but rejects any humanitarian motive, pointing instead to extreme violence, genocides, and mass assaults against native women and children. While the Spanish rationalized their brutality by pointing to the endemic Aztec sacrificial system—where drugged prisoners were led up steep pyramids to have their hearts cut out before their bodies were tumbled down to be consumed—the guest maintains that the colonizers were purely driven by greed and colonization. He adds that South American societies had no such tradition of mass sacrifice, making the violence there even less justifiable. Sheppard addresses why native leaders failed to exploit divisions among the conquistadors, such as the forces sent by the governor of Cuba to arrest Cortés or the later civil war between Pizarro and Almagro. He explains that the Spaniards were all Castilians who would have ultimately united against an existential threat, whereas local groups like the Tlaxcalans refused to ally with the Aztecs because generations of deep-seated hostility made them view the Aztec empire as their primary enemy. He notes that indigenous peoples could not play European powers against each other because the Spanish were the sole outsiders they had encountered at that early stage.
Why Mughal India also couldn't play the Europeans off each other
Sheppard explains that the Mughal Empire peaked under Aurangzeb at the beginning of the eighteenth century, but his successors lacked the authority to maintain that hegemony. Like the Manchu when they conquered the Ming, the Mughals were outsiders who were never truly indigenous to the population. While success continued, local power brokers accepted them, but once momentum halted, regional leaders calculated they had more to gain by breaking away. Without European intervention, the Mughal Empire would have peaked and disintegrated into a patchwork of authorities. The British ultimately took over because the Royal Navy controlled the sea lanes, allowing them to project power and push out the French while the French forces remained landlocked and useless at a distance. Sheppard adds that the East India Company held an organizational advantage as a corporate entity with a board that could hire and fire leaders. Hereditary monarchies inevitably produced bad rulers, such as Alivardi Khan's psychopathic grandson in Bengal, making alliances with competent British outsiders an attractive option for local forces. The majority of the troops the British used were Indian sepoys, allowing them to delegate effectively and avoid succession crises. Sheppard draws a parallel to the Hundred Years' War, noting that both the French and English lost ground when their respective kings suffered from severe mental illnesses. Corporate structures operating for profit prove far more flexible than hierarchical states because they seek competent leadership unattached to bloodlines. Free-market corporations like the East India Company and the Hudson's Bay Company possessed the flexibility to exploit centuries of local grievances and take control of tax revenues, such as Bengal's, to fund their operations. Sheppard notes that the conquistadors and the Vikings were similarly business operations run by freebooters within a capitalist system. Many conquistadors were hidalgos from Castile with titles but few assets, calling themselves compañeros rather than soldados as they pooled resources for high-risk ventures.
Diplomacy was just as important as technology
Sheppard notes that the technological advantages held by the conquistadors were not overwhelmingly large. Guns were unhelpful in actual battle, leaving horses and steel weapons as the primary advantages. Indeed, the Spanish often ditched their heavy, hot metal armor in favor of the local cotton armor used by native populations, though they kept their helmets and occasionally gifted Spanish weapons to prized native allies to bind them into the coalition. The Spanish excelled at identifying local sub-chiefs who resented the imperial authority and wanted a better deal. For example, after the death of the king of Texcoco, a civil war for succession led by his two sons resulted in Moctezuma appointing one brother, prompting the dispossessed brother to immediately side with the Spanish to secure his claim. Local elites believed they were using the Spanish to their own advantage, failing to understand the vast numbers in which Europeans would eventually arrive. Their insular worlds blinded them to the demographic tide that would turn against them, eventually leaving native populations as minorities in their own lands.